

Epilogue and Conclusion

Inextricable ties

When the IMF representative came to Warsaw to negotiate the details of Poland's accession to the organisation, he was surprised by the introduction of martial law on the 13 December 1981.¹ After over a year of balancing between the West, the Soviet Union, and Solidarność, the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP), led by Jaruzelski took drastic measures. While aiming to suppress opposition, calm down socialist allies and restore economic discipline, this choice was also a last-ditch attempt to disentangle Poland from the West. By the 1980s, however, this entanglement proved too profound to be broken by political decision.

These ties with the West are most clearly measured by the rising foreign debt, which increased 24 times between 1970 and 1980.² Given the inefficiency of Poland's economy in the late 1970s, experts realised that the country's finances could be cured only with substantial support from the West. However, IMF membership, which could have eased Poland's situation, was blocked by the Soviet Union. At the same time, from the Polish leadership's perspective, seeking debt-rescheduling was tantamount to admitting their strategy's failure. By the same token, declaring Poland's default was impossible, as it would have risked domestic destabilisation and restricted access to new loans.

All these reservations disappeared in the turmoil of summer 1980. The new leadership of Kania and Jaruzelski agreed to seek membership of the IMF and opened negotiations with the Paris Club, gathering public creditors, and the London Club, which represented private creditors. In March 1981 Polish bankers admitted Poland's inability to fulfil its debt instalments, de facto declaring the country in default. Nevertheless, Western creditors decided to keep this status unofficial, fearing that Poland's bankruptcy could have global repercussions and encourage other states in Eastern Europe and Latin America to follow this path. Instead, the Paris Club offered Poland a rescheduling agreement signed in April 1981. While in the 1970s Western states were uninterested in using economic dependency for pushing political changes in Poland, hoping for a positive evolution instead, this situation changed after 1980. The lack of military intervention in Poland, known as a 'tank clause', became a condition for the validity of the Paris Club's economic concessions.

For this reason, when Jaruzelski imposed martial law, Western states proclaimed a boycott of credits and deliveries, except for products of existential importance. At the same time, Poland disregarded its debt instalments. While for public creditors martial law was an obstacle to solving Poland's crisis, for Western banks the military regime served as proof of Poland's creditworthiness. Consequently, the negotiations with private creditors resulted in the agreement of April 1982. The Soviet Union also rewarded Jaruzelski's regime financially for its decisive suppression of *Solidarność*, providing new loans and deliveries of natural resources. However, concessions from the private creditors and support from the Soviet Union were not enough to save Poland's economy. After martial law was lifted on 22 July 1983, Poland relaunched talks with the Paris Club and negotiations concerning joining the IMF, which materialised in 1986. This institution was of pivotal importance for shaping Poland's economic transformation to a capitalist economy.³ At the same time, talks with Western creditors assumed a certain degree of tolerance for the opposition in Poland, which paved the way for the democratic transition.

The inability to disregard Western states emerged from the fact that Poland's interest in economic cooperation with the West went beyond access to hard currency credit necessary for securing domestic provision. Against an often-made assumption, consumption loans formed only around one-quarter of the overall debt accumulated by 1980, while the rest was spent on industrial production.⁴ As the cases of cars, buses and audio equipment show, production in many sectors depended entirely on imports from Western companies. For this reason, cutting off ties with the capitalist economy signified not only worsening living conditions but actually the paralysis of production in many plants. Furthermore, the strategy of the 1970s created technological entanglement. The inability to catch up with global technological developments made the country dependent on technology transfers from the West, often necessary for the modernisation of previously acquired solutions. The fact that cooperation with Fiat was revived shortly after martial law was lifted supports this point.

These different dimensions of entanglement were all side effects of détente in Europe. The importance of the international political context is illustrated by Poland's overall debt in 1980. Around a half of Poland's debt raised in the 1970s received state guarantees or were granted by the states directly, and over two-thirds of this debt came from Western Europe.⁵ As a result, negotiations with public creditors were more important than negotiations with banks. Moreover, given the political significance of debt, Western states were interested in influencing private creditors' positions, and continued to do so throughout the crisis. By the 1980s the entanglement with the West became Western political leverage.

The diplomatic opening and engagement in multilateral cooperation of the 1970s exposed the Polish leadership to and made them more inclined to respect Western pressures. Since Gierek's decade, Poland had formalised relations with all Western states and remained in regular contact with them. For example, martial law coincided with the third Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) session in Madrid, which offered Western politicians' an opportunity to

influence Jaruzelski's regime. NATO members temporarily suspended the talks and presented a set of political conditions for their reopening.⁶ To a certain extent, the Polish leadership fulfilled these demands in 1982 by introducing the gradual liberalisation of martial law and initiating prison releases. From the Polish policymakers' perspective, endangering the entire Helsinki process was a high price to pay for their actions. Its features, such as border inviolability or disarmament, also discussed during the Madrid conference, continued to be of pivotal importance for Poland's security. By the 1980s these features became conditional upon respect of international norms, including meeting economic commitments and respecting human rights. The connection between different sides of international cooperation and the multiplied number of forums where the East-West interactions took place, gave the Polish leadership little choice but to respect Western demands.

However, the entanglement with the West not only gave Western states leverage over the situation in Poland but also profoundly transformed the socialist regime. Large groups of socialist elites, who themselves had experienced internationalisation as a consequence of the 1970s strategy, desired respect for international norms. Martial law was implemented by a narrow group within the PUP leadership, representing above all military circles, strongly exposed to pressure from the Soviet Union. This decision was not taken in consultation with larger groups of the socialist elites and very likely would not have received their approval. Despite accumulating problems, even in the late 1970s criticism about cooperating with the West was rare. The multiplication of East-West personal interactions lowered fears and improved the general awareness of the situation on the other side of the Iron Curtain. Moreover, the entanglement with the West privileged the careers of officials familiar with Western states and the capitalist economy. Experts, foreign trade professionals, and bankers became critical for the system's functioning, and the 1980s crisis only strengthened their role. These more pragmatic groups were prone to defending cooperation with the West and less interested in preserving the regime at any price. Their influence and the general internationalisation of the socialist elites played an important role in Poland's decisions to reopen talks with Western creditors, subject itself to their pressures, and embark on a path of economic and democratic transformation.

Moreover, by 1981 *Solidarność* became too big and too strongly supported by the West to be suppressed with martial law. Of course, neither the emergence of workers' strikes nor of the dissident groups can be fully explained by Western influence. However, the fact that these groups transformed into a mass movement gathering over 10 million people epitomised the changes in Polish society and the regime's ideological erosion, all undergirded by the opening towards the West. In the 1970s Polish society was more exposed to the West than any time before in the socialist period. Travel to capitalist countries, which became prevalent in the 1970s, as well as the inflow of Western culture and products, made Poles aware of differences between life in the West and life in Poland. This factor contributed to rising frustration, built up in any case by

a rise in expectations that the 1970s leadership fuelled and later did not fulfil. Furthermore, the removal of the Western threat, which took place in the late 1960s and became a backbone of the national strategy of the 1970s, undermined the legitimisation of the socialist regime and its ideological framework. Moreover, the moral supremacy of socialism over capitalism was based on the idea of equality, which also lost its value in the 1970s. The massive arrival of Western goods and ineffective domestic provision rendered Polish socialism unable to maintain equal distribution and instead allowed corruption and the black market to grow on an unprecedented scale. The rising awareness of socialist weakness when compared with the West and the declining legitimacy of the regime in Poland, underlay the mass support for the *Solidarność* movement and its strength. In turn, these features made it a unique phenomenon and caught global attention. In the 1980s the Western states developed dual-diplomacy practices that involved maintaining relations both with the Polish leadership and with *Solidarność*. The former's tolerance of the latter became a critical demand.

Finally, Gierek's policy of opening and the emergence of opposition cemented the picture of Poland as a deserving cause in the eyes of policymakers on the West. Recognising the signs of change in the socialist elites and the crystallising alternative to them, Western states continued to broaden cooperation with Poland even when its economic situation drastically worsened in the second half of the 1970s. For this reason, in the 1980s it became increasingly clear that they were willing to offer Poland a way out of the crisis for the price of gradual internal changes. In contrast, martial law revealed that the Soviet Union and other socialist regimes, themselves struggling with economic decline, were neither capable of nor willing to do so.

The reason why the PUWP leadership of the 1980s could not simply disregard the West is that Poland's interconnectedness with capitalist countries went much deeper than financial dependence. The system of entanglement created as a result of the 1970s policy of opening towards the West included not only economic but political, technological, cultural, and personal ties. All of these penetrated the socialist regime, reorganising its political landscape and narrowing down its room for manoeuvre.

In the second half 1980s these various effects produced by the policy of opening towards the West made the Polish socialist elites eager to profoundly reform the regime. In the meantime, such a reform became possible thanks to Mikhail Gorbachev's arrival to power in the Soviet Union in 1985. The PUWP jumped on this opportunity and started to gradually dismantle the system. In 1989 this process culminated with the Round Table negotiations and the first semi-free elections in socialist Europe.

Domestic mistakes or external misfortunes?

Although the 1970s opening towards the West eventually brought down the socialist regime, this policy was desired by the Polish socialist elites and largely

shaped by them as well. Their agency played a vital role in each of the four phases of the national strategy of the 1970s. The domestic debates, taking place as a form of polemic with Gomulka's policy, allowed new ideas to emerge. These ideas laid the groundwork for the reversal of domestic and international agendas. Although the opening towards the West was rarely declared as a goal as such, it underpinned all the new political choices. Later, the policymakers' proactive attitude encouraged them to broaden cooperation with the West in response to external factors. Finally, the leadership continued to follow the strategy despite signs of an upcoming crisis. Similarly, the socialist elites' role is apparent in the field of transfers of technology. In this case, Polish representatives effectively shaped the means and manner of cooperation with the West by choosing countries and companies of their preference and negotiating beneficial deals. In sum, broadening ties with the West was a conscious strategy of the socialist elites in the 1970s.

Although initially this strategy received Soviet support, its scale soon spiralled out of control and became problematic for Moscow. While all of the socialist regimes increased their contacts with the West in the 1970s, Poland was a frontrunner of these practices among the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and Warsaw Pact members. This difference can be explained by the fact that interwar Poland had stronger ties with the West than some other countries in the region. As the cases of Fiat and Berliet demonstrated, the pre-Second World War cooperation facilitated deals with Western companies. Poland also entered the 1970s with strong economic, cultural, and personal connections to capitalist countries. However, other socialist regimes sharing these characteristics, including the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, did not practice opening on so many different fields and on such a large scale. Consequently, none of them ended the decade with such a formidable crisis.⁷ Moscow's scepticism towards Poland's political line and a comparison with other socialist regimes points to the importance of the national elites in shaping trajectories in Poland.

Moreover, in the 1970s Poland became increasingly detached from a universal socialist model. While basic socialist principles were not questioned during Gierek's tenure, they were also very rarely referred to as an objective of policymaking. Similarly, other socialist regimes were hardly invoked as positive or negative examples to follow. Instead, the agenda had domestic origins, was fuelled by fascination with the Japanese example, and pivoted in comparison with West European economies.

Although the strategy had internal roots, it did not secure the Polish socialist elites' consistent and unequivocal support. While initially it was based on a strong consensus between different groups and factions, with time and the accumulation of economic and political problems, fewer and fewer officials believed that the national strategy could work. Throughout the decade, voices opposing Gierek's strategy were raised by the older generation of PUPW members, the military and secret services, and experts acting independently and in state bodies. Although various officials and institutions undermined specific

aspects of the agenda, first and foremost uncontrolled indebtedness, throughout the 1970s there was surprisingly little opposition to the strategy of opening towards the West. Before the late 1970s, entanglement with the West was rarely discussed as a problematic phenomenon. Even then, calls for using drastic means in the name of Poland's sovereignty were rare. On the contrary, closer cooperation with the West was advocated by wide groups of socialist elites, including most of the 1970s leadership and industrial elites, which also profited from it.

These individual and institutional interests were important drivers of Poland's national strategy in the 1970s. The licence policy demonstrates how the particular goals of ministries and associations stimulated cooperation with the West. Similarly, the actions of the leadership are usually understood in these terms. Considering the preservation of power was their ultimate goal, the policy of opening is generally considered an outcome of this objective. Such an argument applies above all to the late 1970s. However, even for this period, remaining in power was not the only factor for policymaking. While these individual interests were undoubtedly vital, the broadly shared logic underlying Poland's opening towards the West was above all influenced by international developments.

It is not a coincidence that the golden decade of Poland's socialist history coincided with the golden decade of détente. Peaceful coexistence in Europe was an assumption that undergirded the whole national strategy, determined its shape, and enabled it. The most important feature of these political changes was reconciliation with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). However, the divergence between the US and Western Europe that undermined the Cold War bipolarity also became an invitation for the Polish socialist regime to open economically and politically. Similarly, the Helsinki processes created unprecedented circumstances for expanding contacts with the West and cemented Poland's policy. From this perspective, the national strategy of the 1970s can be viewed as an effort to secure Poland's place in the reorganising international order.

A similar dynamic can be observed in the case of the economy. Changes in global capitalism are usually seen as a contributing factor in the failure of Poland's strategy. However, this strategy was largely designed to respond to these developments. The assumptions formulated in the late 1960s, by Gomułka and his allies, as well as by their critics, insisted on redirecting Poland's economic focus and making domestic industries better adapted for international exchange. After December 1970 this goal was only reinforced. Using tools such as licence acquisitions the new leadership aimed at increasing Poland's participation in global markets. The monetary and oil crises only accelerated this strategy, as socialist policymakers assumed that they could use the global turmoil to their own advantage. The 1970s strategy was a means of readjusting to the rapidly changing global economy.

Framing Poland's 1970s agenda as an attempt at adapting the socialist regime to international transformations invites comparison with other international

actors, particularly Western European companies and states. While Western economies could share the burden of economic turmoil with private enterprises, the socialist regime had to steer the adaptation of the whole national economy with centralised tools. In this sense, the challenges it faced were similar to the ones of Fiat, Berliet, Grundig, and the other aforementioned companies, and included rising global competition, fast technological developments and the need to maintain a balance between efficiency and workers' demands. The fact that both Poland and these companies, despite the political obstacles, sought cooperation with each other attests to their difficult situation. Among companies discussed in this book, Fiat is the only one that survived the 1970s turmoil. All the others either were consumed by larger groups, as in case of Berliet and Grundig, experienced numerous splits and reorganisations, as in the case of Thomson, or went bankrupt, as in the case of Ferranti. By the early 1990s all of these companies ceased to exist in the form known in the 1970s. This was also the case for the Polish socialist regime.

Moreover, after the experience of the 1970s, Western European states also had to adjust their macro-economic frameworks. Although the scale of crisis inherited from the decade was incomparable with the one faced by the socialist economies, it also triggered substantial economic transformation. The case of Thatcherism in the UK and France's 'tournant de la rigueur' exemplify Western European capitalism's new austerity outlook, born as a response to the 1970s crisis.⁸

However, before this, to mitigate the adverse effects of the new difficulties, Western European states increased their integration. Companies that were unable to survive in their original form applied a similar strategy, merging with each other and transforming into multinationals. In the case of the socialist regimes, such efforts were paralysed by the CMEA and Warsaw Pact members' national interests and by fear of Soviet dominance, to a certain extent present among socialist elites in all Eastern European regimes. Paradoxically, while the 1970s crisis boosted integration in the West, it dismantled socialist unity. As argued by Silvio Pons, it was precisely this decreasing unity of international communism which lay at heart of its decline.⁹

Nevertheless, Poland's failure to withstand the 1970s challenge was caused by more than the weakness of socialist cooperation. The national strategy embarked upon after Gierek's takeover was risky at its core, and the socialist elites were well aware of this fact. During the debates on licence policy, even the most prominent leadership members admitted the peril of their choices. Almost all of the late 1970s' problematic developments were foreseen in the early years of the decade. From this perspective, one can say that policymaking in the 1970s was marked by a certain degree of hazard and incompetence. Apart from exaggerated interpretations of international events, the leadership's mistakes included, above all, lack of efficient central control and the continuation of its strategy despite signs of a forthcoming crisis.

The Polish national strategy of the 1970s failed, owing to a combination of domestic and external factors. However, as demonstrated by the licence policy,

some of the objectives established in the early years of the decade were met. Peaceful coexistence on the continent and the industry's modernisation were the most significant achievements of the leadership and the ones that had a critical influence on Poland's future after the fall of the regime.

Socialist Poland and global transformations

The fact that the socialist regime did not survive the reorganisation of the political and economic order that began in the 1970s does not mean that it did not shape these processes. On the contrary, the political choices of the socialist elites and the crisis of 1980, which they had created, were of major importance not only for the Polish future but also for European and global changes.

By presenting a strong commitment to the idea of *détente* and basing it on a differentiation between Western Europe and the US, the Polish socialist elites coproduced a process of 'Europeanisation'. Their policy of opening aimed to cement peaceful coexistence and cooperation on the continent through different means, including diplomacy, economy, technology, and, to a certain extent, the flow of people and ideas. Moreover, the Polish socialist elites played a prominent role in initiating and materialising the CSCE, the symbol of European *détente*. This subsequently executed agenda served as proof that the socialist regime could experience a gradual liberalisation and thus encouraged Western European states to continue their *Ostpolitik*. In this sense, Polish strategy in the 1970s influenced Western policy, as Western attitudes influenced the choices of Polish policymakers. European *détente* emerged from efforts coming from the West and from the East, and the interaction of these efforts.

The pan-European system of cooperation created on the backdrop of this policy outlived the Cold War crisis of the 1980s. Although Poland became an epicentre of these events, numerous Polish actors, including members of the PUP leadership, industrial elites, bankers, experts – not to mention the opposition – sought to maintain these contacts. Similarly, although the US and Western Europe tried to speak in one voice during the Polish 1981 crisis, in reality, the latter remained uninterested in using drastic means to push for political changes. As in Poland, this policy had a strong economic motivation, as it endangered Western European interests.¹⁰ At the same time, on both sides of the continent, the policy epitomised a strong commitment to the idea of *détente* and reinforced the conviction that undermining the Cold War division was beneficial for European states. The continuation of East-West cooperation in the 1980s only reinforced socialist regimes' entanglement with the West. By this means, it paved a way for the peaceful end of the Cold War, a conflict which despite its global reach started and ended in Europe.¹¹

However, this process of 'Europeanisation' also sheds new light on the European Union (EU)'s Eastern enlargement, initiated for Poland only four years after the collapse of the socialist regime and concluded in 2004. This has conventionally been understood as a political step, aiming to stimulate post-socialist countries liberal reforms and a turn to the West after 1989. Yet, it was also a response to the already existing intertwined system created by European

détente, which was especially strong in the Polish case. Moreover, the socialist elites' efforts to secure ties with Western European states against their proceeding integration demonstrate the importance that the EEC and later the EU had for Poland, regardless of its political and economic shape. The decision to apply for EU membership made by democratic and capitalist Poland was a natural consequence of the Polish socialist regime's policy.

As in the case of 'Europeanisation', the firm caesura of 1989 does not apply to the process of globalisation. The Polish case demonstrates the sharp increase in entanglement with the global economy that took place in the 1970s, making its further acceleration difficult to avoid and providing a framework for the unfolding of this process. The ties created in this period had a pivotal influence on the shape of the 1990s globalisation. Gierek's modernisation programme laid the groundwork for Poland's fast economic growth after the collapse of the socialist regime. As with the cases of licence agreements, companies that collaborated with the Polish socialist regime found themselves in an advantageous position after its fall. Fiat and Thomson became essential players in the privatisation initiated after 1989. Moreover, the FRG problem, which was of central importance to Poland's policymaking, stimulated broadening ties with other European states. Despite their geographic proximity, in the 1990s Poland's economic exchange was not concentrated in Germany but instead spread across the continent. From this perspective, the détente policy directly influenced the process of globalisation in Poland. At the same time, the 1970s globalisation encouraged the process of détente by creating challenges that made Western companies seek means of cooperation with socialist regimes. The Polish case demonstrates strong interaction between the Cold War dynamic and globalisation. Ultimately, it was this increasingly interconnectedness which brought down the European socialist regimes and secured the peaceful end of the Cold War.

Moreover, the globalisation of the 1970s saw a rise in multilateral cooperation, which constituted the seedbed for the post-Cold War multipolar world order. From late in Gomułka's tenure, the Polish national strategy assumed active participation in international organisations, both in the socialist states and in those gathering on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Unlike Romania, Poland regarded the CMEA and the Warsaw Pact as forums that offered a chance to gain broader support for its initiatives and limit Soviet dominance. Although these organisations did not protect the socialist regimes from global transformation, and instead became a burden for them, the Polish leadership attempted to use them to their advantage. Nonetheless, throughout the 1970s Poland's enthusiasm for this cooperation steadily declined. At the same time, during this decade Poland held membership in more international organisations and conferences than any other European socialist regime. Moreover, it launched new initiatives and aimed to reinvigorate bodies such as the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, becoming one of the actors that struggled to remake the format of international cooperation. The importance of multilateral cooperation also finds reflection in the rise of academic research on this topic as well as the background of Gierek's advisors, who were both

experts in international economic cooperation. In the 1970s multilateral logic gradually replaced national-state logic, paving the way for Poland's integration within NATO and the EU.

Finally, Poland's socialist elites contributed to the making of the neoliberal face of globalisation in the 1990s. In the 1970s, while respecting socialist principles domestically, internationally, the Polish leadership called for liberalisation and reducing trade restrictions. Later, the crisis of the 1980s resulted in the revival of economic debates in Poland. However, since the failure of Gierek's strategy, the reform proposals implied various degrees of marketisation and foreign investment.¹² In this sense, the transformation to liberal economics steadily emerged within the national framework.¹³ It developed alongside a worsening economic situation and tragically declining quality of life. This set of circumstances, fuelled by early 1980s propaganda which blamed the 1970s leadership, created a trauma of debt that impacted the socialist elites and broader society alike. While the need to pay back foreign debt explains the massive privatisation of the 1990s, this trauma underlaid the general acceptance of this policy.

Moreover, the Polish crisis of the early 1980s resonated internationally, affecting creditors and debtors alike. While the banks lost their faith in the creditworthiness of the socialist regimes after summer 1980, Western states initiated a credit boycott during Poland's period of martial law. This significantly worsened the situation of other indebted states, above all Romania, the GDR, and Hungary. The response adopted by these countries was strongly influenced by the negative example of Poland and the rise of *Solidarność*. While in Romania this strategy implied a severe austerity policy, in the GDR this approach was combined with taking more loans.¹⁴ Similarly, uncontrolled developments in Poland likely drove Hungary's decision to join the IMF in 1983 and Soviet consent for this step. In this sense, the Polish crisis accelerated the spiral of events in the region. In addition, it was a first symptom of the global sovereign debt crisis. Poland's default in 1981 affected other socialist regimes, and Mexico's default in 1982 similarly affected Latin America. The debt crisis became a global phenomenon that impacted societies, policy-makers, and bankers in both creditor and debtor states. This international trauma of debt lay at the heart of the Washington consensus and its wide acceptance.

The 1970s opening towards the West initiated by the Polish socialist elites contributed to the end of the Cold War and the making of the post-Cold War world order. Poland was an important coproducer of processes such as 'Europeanisation' and globalisation, influencing their shape and encouraging their progress. By applying the strategy of cooperation with the West on a larger scale than other socialist regimes in the 1970s, it later became a pioneer of changes in the region.

Notes

1 Karcz, *Zadłużenie zagraniczne Polski*, 62–66.

2 See: Appendix.

3 See for instance: Randall Stone, *Lending Credibility, The International Monetary Fund and the Post-Communist Transition* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,

- 2002); Grigore Pop-Eleches, *From Economic Crisis to Reform: IMF Programs in Latin America and Eastern Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).
- 4 Approximation based on: AAN, BH 638, 55/186, 'Sprawozdanie o kredytach zagranicznych 1980', 10.
 - 5 'Polish foreign debt with market economies countries as of 31.12.1980', in Karcz, *Zadłużenia zagraniczne Polski*, 94.
 - 6 Angela Romano, 'More Cohesive, Still Divergent: Western Europe, the US, and the Madrid CSCE Follow-Up Meeting', in Kiran Klaus Patel and Ken Weisbrode (eds), *European Integration and the Atlantic Community in the 1980s* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 39–58.
 - 7 For the strategy of the GDR, Hungary and Czechoslovakia and the other socialist regimes in the 1970s see: Romano and Romero (eds), *European Socialist Regimes*.
 - 8 For the comparison of the response to the crisis in the 1980s in the socialist and capitalist countries see: Bartel, *The Triumph of Broken Promises*.
 - 9 Silvio Pons, *The Global Revolution. A History of International Communism 1917–1991* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
 - 10 For tensions in transatlantic alliance after the Polish crisis see for instance: Andrea Chiampan, "'Those European Chicken Littles": Reagan, NATO, and the Polish Crisis, 1981–2', *The International History Review* 37:4 (2015): 682–99.
 - 11 Romero, 'Cold war historiography', 697–703.
 - 12 On economic reforms in Poland in the 1980s see: Dariusz Gala, *Reformy gospodarcze w PRL (1982–1989). Próba uratowania socjalizmu* (Warsaw: Trio, 2015).
 - 13 Bockman, *Markets in the Name*.
 - 14 Ban, 'Sovereign Debt, Austerity, and Regime Change'; Maximilian Graf, 'Before Strauß: The East German Struggle to Avoid Bankruptcy During the Debt Crisis Revisited', *The International History Review* 42:4 (2020): 737–54.