Introduction

The 1970s in Poland started and ended on a similar note. In both December 1970 and August 1980, protests erupted in reaction to rising prices, sweeping away the socialist leadership and resulting in a reversal of national strategy. However, the character of these protests, the manner in which they were handled, and the political choices which followed differed profoundly from one decade to the next. While the upheavals in 1970 were carried out by workers calling for the cancellation of price reform, the 1980 strikes were transformed into the Solidarność (Solidarity) movement, supported by influential dissident organisations. This time, protesters demanded not only an improvement in economic and labour conditions, but also called for respect for human rights, to which European socialist regimes had committed by signing the Helsinki Final Act in August 1975. Unlike in December 1970, when Władysław Gomułka's leadership initially responded to protests with violence, in August 1980, the Edward Gierek-led Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) sat down at the negotiating table with demonstrators, agreeing to accommodate their requests. Although these concessions facilitated a change in the PUWP leadership, Gierek's successors stood little chance of launching a substantially different strategy. While in December 1970 Poland had foreign currency savings, its net foreign debt amounted to US$24 billion by August 1980.[1] In striking contrast to a decade before, the later crisis could not be explained without taking into consideration Western influence, nor could it be handled independently of Western actors. This entanglement was the most critical and irreversible outcome of the 1970s in Poland.

This book covers the period between the two upheavals, reconstructs the formation and practices of Poland's national strategy, and explains why Poland's entanglement with the West occurred. It shows that this entanglement was the outcome of conscious and confident choices made by Polish socialist elites, who believed that Poland could open up towards the West without endangering socialism.

Socialist Elites

Placing the Polish socialist elites and their goals and expectations at the centre of analysis may appear of little relevance. Despite having a monopoly of power

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for over 40 years, the ideas of this group are rarely perceived as worthy of attention. The origins of this phenomenon are twofold. First, the positions of national socialist elites are usually considered to be determined either by the Soviet Union or, in the case of Poland, domestic factors such as the fear of popular protests. Second, socialist elites are often judged as incompetent. In Poland, the 1970s leadership is considered in this way more than any other. However, looking at the socialist elites from these perspectives is not only intellectually limiting but also often empirically incorrect.

Assessing the degree to which Moscow influenced policymaking in the European socialist regimes is a difficult task. The bulk of Soviet influence derived from informal conversations and the self-limitation of national leaders, rather than official policies. Following de-Stalinisation, the choices made by the European socialist regimes were largely determined by their national interests as represented by national socialist elites.[2] The variety of national strategies, from Western-oriented and liberal Poland and Hungary and the restrictive but economically superior German Democratic Republic (GDR) to the authoritarian and sovereignty-seeking Romania, best demonstrate that after 1956 there was no universal recipe for European socialism.[3]

These differences in strategies and national interests, defined by socialist elites in their respective countries, regularly clashed in the multilateral forums, which according to popular perception were only tools of Soviet military and economic domination. In fact, the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA, commonly known as Comecon), cornerstones of the socialist bloc in Europe, offered smaller socialist states room for independent manoeuvre and a space where they could elude Moscow's policy line. These often-successful attempts reveal that the socialist regimes differed not only in terms of domestic strategies but also foreign policy.[4]

Moscow's changing attitude to its European allies enabled them to gradually increase their room for independent manoeuvre. After the 1968 Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia and the proclamation of the Brezhnev doctrine, the limits of divergence were re-established. However, the threat of intervention became an essential tool of Soviet control as other incentives for the alliance with Moscow gradually waned. Throughout the 1970s socialist regimes increasingly became an economic burden for the Soviet Union. As a consequence, its readiness to use all possible means to maintain control over Central and Eastern Europe also declined.[5]

Poland's relationship with Moscow in the period since the 1960s can be characterised in terms of clientelism, rather than dominance or subordination. Although the strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union changed, all Polish socialist leaderships continuously sought ways to expand the country's margin of independence. Gomułka's defence of Poland's national interests famously led to clashes with Moscow. In turn, Gierek aimed to build trust and avoid conflict. The particularly amicable relationship between Poland and the Soviet Union in the 1970s became essential for an independent domestic policy and, crucially, expanding the relationship with the West.[6]

Apart from the influence of the Soviet Union, the choices of the Polish socialist elites have typically been attributed to domestic factors. According to the master narrative of Poland's history of socialism, the chain of domestic upheavals – including 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976, and 1980 – constrained the room for manoeuvre of the socialist elites, making them largely subject to the demands expressed on the streets. This emphasis on the revolts against socialism were essential for cementing the post-Cold War world order. Internationally, they are reminders that socialism failed to fulfil consumption needs and never garnered popular support. Locally, they served as a foundation myth for post-1989 Poland. In this depiction, society is equated with freedom-seeking dissident groups, while the socialist elites are monolithic and interested exclusively in maintaining power. While the critique of post-1989 Polish historiography, which for years evolved around the five aforementioned dates, has resulted in an outflow of new social history studies on socialism, it has not brought about a radical revision in the approach to the socialist elites.[7]

The argument about the importance of the socialist elites has been famously made by Stephen Kotkin. Discussing the debate on the fall of socialist regimes, he criticised the over-appreciation of the role of 'civil society', proposing instead a turn towards 'uncivil society'. However, his focus on the socialist establishment in Poland, the GDR, and Romania led him to the conclusion that the Polish decision to democratise political life emerged from incompetence and, more specifically, the establishment's inability to rule its country in conditions of social and economic crisis.[8] While this argument demonstrates the logic which led Polish socialist elites to the Round Table negotiations in 1989, it also reinforces a perception of them as vulnerable and incompetent.[9] This view usually underlines the studies on the socialist elites and is particularly present in the studies on Poland in the 1970s.

Such a depiction of Gierek's leadership extends to the early 1980s with the first attempts to evaluate his legacy. Studies on the 1970s flourished against the backdrop of the broader margins of freedom of speech available in 1981, the period referred to as 'the carnival of Solidarność', economic crisis, as well as the official campaign against Gierek and his allies launched by their successors.[10] As a polemic against the official line of defence taken by policymakers in the 1970s, who claimed that their strategy failed as a consequence of external factors, the country's political scientists and economists identified many critical trends and pathologies that caused the domestic crisis, which were crucially mistaken and incompetent decisions.[11] This assumption was confirmed by the first studies on Solidarność, which were also produced in the 1980s, following a wave of international enthusiasm for the workers' movement. Timothy Garton Ash, who investigated the origins of this phenomenon, pointed to Gierek's strategy and 'the breathtaking incompetence with which it was executed' as one of the factors distinguishing Poland from other socialist regimes and enabling mass mobilisation.[12]

This debate resurfaced in the early 1990s with the outpouring of the testimonies of policymakers from the 1970s. For instance, in a long interview with

Gierek published as *Przerwana dekada* (Interrupted Decade), the former first secretary also claimed that the economic decline was caused by external factors and suggested that Poland's situation suddenly worsened in the early 1980s because of his dismissal and the revision of his strategy.[13]

However, this defence of the economic policy of the 1970s stood little chance of resonating with post-socialist Poland. In 1989, foreign net debt amounted to US$44 billion and was considered the main obstacle to the country's development.[14] Mainstream economic thought after the fall of the socialist regime univocally advocated for austerity, which confirmed the depiction of the 1970s as a 'wasted decade'.[15] Still today, Polish historians assume the decisions made by Gierek's leadership were ill-judged and determined by a need to secure domestic stability and maintain power.[16]

In this book I do not provide a judgement on whether the decline of Poland's strategy of the 1970s was caused by extraneous forces or if the leadership was to blame. However, I offer a more nuanced approach to this polarised debate. First, I take the Polish socialist elites seriously. I do not consider this group as monolith and inherently incompetent and I do not see its choices as pre-determined by the Soviet Union or the demands expressed by protesters. Instead, I show that the socialist elites' ideas evolved, clashed with each other and that they matter.[17] Second, I establish a closer connection between the socialist elites and external factors. The changes in the international and economic situation in the 1970s influenced policymaking in Poland, just as Polish policymaking influenced these developments.

Détente, European Integration, and Globalisation

The 1970s were marked by three processes of critical importance for Poland's opening towards the West: a détente in Cold War relations, Western European integration, and globalisation. In recent years, all three areas have seen a historiographical boom. This new scholarship has produced a firm picture of the 1970s as a transformative decade that was of central importance for the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a new world order.[18] However, the European socialist regimes remain underrepresented in this research.

The first and most evident of these processes was a détente in Cold War relations. Traditionally, this refers to the period of the relaxation of tensions between the superpowers which followed the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and ended with the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the introduction of martial law in Poland in 1981. However, the substantial broadening of the field of Cold War studies has challenged the understanding of the détente as exclusively a foreign policy status quo designed by the US and USSR.[19] Authors applying a European lens have revealed that in Europe the traditionally defined détente does not correspond either in terms of chronology and themes, or in terms of objectives.

From the perspective of foreign policy, the European détente relates to the Ostpolitik agenda, which originated in Western Europe in the 1960s. While the

French president Charles de Gaulle was the first to talk openly about extending cooperation to the socialist part of Europe in 1966, it was only after Willy Brandt and the Social Democratic Party of Germany came to power in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in 1969, that this policy became prevalent in Western capitals. The subsequent political choices made by the new leadership in West Germany – most importantly including the Treaty of Moscow with the Soviet Union and the Treaty of Warsaw with Poland in 1970, as well as the Basic Treaty with the GDR in 1972 – resulted in an increase in political and economic contacts on the continent, unprecedented in post-war European history. This period is sometimes referred to as the 'high détente'. It peaked in 1975 with the Helsinki Accords, when the European territorial status quo was confirmed, and the participating states agreed to broaden and solidify cooperation on the continent.[20] In striking contrast to the superpower détente, the European process did not end with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Although the Polish crisis of 1981 brought more damage to the relations between European states, Western Europe opposed the headstrong foreign policy line developed by the US president Ronald Reagan and became a frontrunner in rebuilding East-West contacts. As suggested by Csaba Békés, the détente in Europe continued until the end of the Cold War.[21]

The open-ended chronology of the European détente results from the fact that it cannot be reduced to a foreign policy phenomenon. In contrast to the superpower détente, the European détente was as much about economic, cultural, and ideological exchanges as it was about international affairs. In recent years, scholars have brought to light numerous spheres of interaction and cooperation, which took place in Europe under the umbrella of détente.[22]

However, the perspective of the socialist regimes remains marginalised in this flourishing scholarship. In the case of Poland, with a few notable exceptions,[23] research on the détente focuses only on its foreign policy dimension and, being largely produced in Polish, functions independently of the international scholarship.[24] The underrepresentation of socialist regimes in the rising international history of détente carries consequences for the overall depiction of this period. Inevitably, the socialist part of the continent emerges as a passive actor, which merely responded to initiatives coming from Western Europe. The vocabulary often applied in such détente studies, including phrases such as 'Helsinki trap',[25] only reinforces this effect, implying that Ostpolitik was a long-term masterplan. Such an idea would be historically mistaken. Studies on Western European détente have shown that even the most ambitious architects of this policy did not expect that the socialist regimes would collapse by the 1990s. Instead, they hoped to improve international security, challenge bipolarity, establish closer economic cooperation, and open up the possibility of a gradual convergence between the socialist regimes and the social democratic model developed in Western Europe. While these goals were more ambitious than those of the superpowers, which were interested in maintaining the status quo, they were still conservative.[26] As I show in this book, the Polish socialist elites deserve to be recognised as equally important for shaping the European détente

as their Western counterparts; their goals and expectations largely mirrored those of the Ostpolitik actors.

The second, critical development of the 1970s is Western European integration. According to the traditional narrative of its history, the European Economic Community (EEC), following its 1957 establishment with the Treaty of Rome, saw the successful integration of the six original members throughout the first eight years. The empty chair crisis of 1965 marked the beginning of the European integration crisis, which ended only in the mid-1980s with the European Single Act negotiations. As a result, the period in between has been referred to as one of 'eurosclerosis'.

However, in recent years, this picture has been almost completely reversed. New studies have not only revealed that the 1970s brought about many critical changes, but also that the crisis expedited them. These changes included monetary cooperation, improvement of the Common Agricultural Policy and the implementation of the Common Commercial Policy in 1975 as well as the first enlargement in 1973. Moreover, during the 1970s, the EEC expanded its institutional apparatus. In 1974 it created the European Council and in 1979 it held the first elections to the European Parliament. Finally, as early as 1969 the EEC introduced the European Political Cooperation tool, which was intended to increase political cohesion. In summary, in the 1970s, the EEC became more economically integrated, grew in size, and began to aspire to a more significant political role.[27]

These aspirations proved largely successful. A volume on external EEC relations during the Cold War identified the 1970s as the critical decade for the transformation of the organisation's geopolitical role. As Piers Ludlow writes: 'Europe seemed to have discovered a collective Cold War role during the era of high détente that they had struggled to achieve at any earlier point'.[28] The stronger cooperation took place not only in the context of an economic crisis, but also of an increasing divergence between the US and EEC members. The 1970s were particularly difficult years for the Cold War transatlantic relationship. Disagreements centred around economic and monetary matters, as well as foreign policy questions such as the war in Vietnam, the relationship with China, and European détente.[29] According to Angela Romano, it is the last of these that became a key foreign policy priority for the EEC and the testing ground for its new policy cohesion mechanism. Romano shows that EEC members successfully coordinated and pushed through their vision for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), promoted pan-European cooperation, and deliberately challenged the bipolar Cold War division of the continent.[30]

This new framing of the role of the EEC, which emerged from the intersection of scholarship on Western European integration and the détente, brought a response from scholars investigating socialist regimes.[31] While the relationship between the EEC and the CMEA has long been observed by political scientists and historians,[32] specific national cases, however, have only recently attracted the attention of scholars. These studies have shown that the goals of the European socialist regimes were not fully grasped by the line represented by the

CMEA and that the creation of the Common Market posed a significant economic challenge to the European socialist regimes.[33]

In this book, I build on this research and further emphasise the importance of Western European integration for socialist Europe. However, I depict the EEC not only as a central economic actor but also a political one, something that scholars recognise only for the post-1989 period. I show that the increasing integration of Western Europe and its divergence from the US contributed to reorganising the international imagination of the Polish socialist elites and thus to shaping Poland's national strategy in the 1970s.

The third critical process for the Polish socialist elites is globalisation. The 1970s brought an end to the steady and harmonious post-1945 economic growth of the West, often considered a golden age of capitalism. The collapse of the Bretton Woods financial system, the backbone of the post-war economic architecture, and the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 marked the birth of a new global financial capitalism characterised by a rapid increase in cross-border capital flows, the deterritorialisation of production, and the rise of multinationals.[34] Taken together with the beginning of computerisation and the emergence of new transnational actors this economic process created the 'shock of the global' in the 1970s.[35]

The socialist regimes were not absent from this rising interconnectedness. While political scientists have tended to recognise their increased integration with the global economy in the 1970s,[36] this phenomenon started to be explored by historians only recently. Successfully linking the history of globalisation with that of the Cold War, these new studies evidenced the central importance of phenomena such as oil shocks and the sovereign debt crisis of the 1980s for the decline of European socialist regimes.[37]

This extension of the history of globalisation to include socialist regimes required the definition of their role in the process. In recent years, the idea that globalisation victimised the socialist regimes – popular in the 1990s – underwent a drastic revision.[38] Scholars began to study the system of global connections created by the Soviet Union and other socialist regimes, especially in the 1950s and 1960s, often recognising this 'alternative globalisation' as a challenge posed by socialist regimes and the Global South to the developed capitalist countries.[39] However, they agree that in the 1970s, attempts at creating a different model of globalisation diminished and all its actors gradually turned towards the West.[40]

As a result, roughly 20 years before their collapse, socialist regimes became part of an unfolding globalisation, defined by capitalism, alongside Western countries and institutions. Nevertheless, taking a political economy perspective, Besnik Pula makes a point about the agency of socialist regimes in this capitalist globalisation. Specifically, he argues that although Western actors were more influential in this process, as regards the socialist regimes 'by navigating at the margins and helping shape the articulations of globalisation in both pre-and post-1989 East Europe, local elites and other actors played their role in molding globalisation in forms amenable to local conditions and harnessing its forces in

the service of domestic goals'.[41] I share this interpretation and historicise it by showing the motivations of socialist elites for engaging with the global economy and the manner in which 'molding globalisation' took place. Given the importance of détente and the rise of the EEC, the Polish socialist elites consciously built connections with the capitalist side of the continent. As a result, the Polish experience of the 1970s can be framed not only as 'globalisation', but also as 'Europeanisation'.

Methodology and book structure

Although Poland's path to globalisation led through Western Europe, in this book I often use the terms 'West' or 'capitalist countries'. This terminology follows the language used by the Polish socialist elites in the 1970s. By the same token, I use the term 'socialism' instead of 'communism'. The socialist regimes referred to themselves as 'socialist' rather than 'communist' as the latter term was reserved for socialism's final stage and its ultimate goal. However, leaving aside the term communism is also an interpretative choice. By the 1970s, the socialist elites aimed at maintaining socialist principles that were already in place rather than advancing them further towards communism.

The focus on the socialist elites requires the conceptualisation of this group. I define socialist elites as all actors who participated in the process of policymaking and the debates leading to it. Such an approach differs from the one usually applied in socialist regimes research, which remains focused on the centre of power, namely the Politburo and its first secretary. By way of contrast, much less attention has been received by other groups of socialist elites, including representatives of the state apparatus, experts and industrial elites.

Broadening the understanding of socialist elites and the policymaking process has had consequences for the scope of research. Apart from the archival collections of two critical institutions – namely the Central Committee of the PUWP and the government – I also rely on sources from other state institutions such as ministries, commissions, banks, and foreign trade enterprises. In order to reconstruct the views present among socialist elites, the sources also encompass broad research into publications from the 1970s. Poland distinguished itself from other socialist regimes with its more permissive approach to freedom of speech, something that makes these sources particularly relevant. Except for *Trybuna Ludu* (The Peoples' Tribune), a PUWP propaganda daily, I approach these printed sources as not only an attempt to rationalise the political choices of socialist elites but also a reflection of their actual debates as such. In reconstructing these debates, I also rely on the testimonies of members of the 1970s socialist elites. These include both published memoirs and interviews conducted as part of this study. Finally, given this book's focus on Poland's opening towards the West, I also use sources collected in Western European states and corporate archives. Bringing in sources from outside Poland serves two goals: not only do they reveal how Poland's national strategy in the 1970s resonated abroad, but they also helped me to identify the puzzles behind the stories which I tell in this book.

This book is divided into two parts. In the first part, it examines Poland's national strategy starting from the late Gomułka period to the end of Gierek's leadership of the PUWP in September 1980. The second part zooms in on the implementation of this strategy in Polish-Western European relations by considering case studies on the licence agreements Poland concluded in the 1970s.

The first chapter engages with the origins of the new economic and foreign policy agenda implemented when Gierek came to power. By examining the attitude of socialist elites to the chief aspects of this strategy – namely opening towards the West, consumption, and accelerated economic growth in the late 1960s – it shows that the shift in economic and foreign policy had its structural and intellectual origins in this very period. To that end, it challenges the assumption that the new strategy was determined solely by the domestic events of December 1970 in Poland.

The second chapter turns to personnel, institutional, and political changes, which took place after Gierek's rise to power. Examining and contextualising the details of decisions made in this period, it reveals that the new strategy was a confident project based on a strong consensus between different groups of socialist elites. It further argues that this bold policymaking was enabled by two widespread assumptions: that the socialist regime was capable of experiencing an economic revival and that détente would remain a permanent feature of European international relations.

The third chapter looks at three critical developments that transpired in the early 1970s: the economic crisis in the West, Western European integration, and the Helsinki process. It focuses in particular on the perspective of their reception in Poland. Although today all three are recognised as factors that led to the weakening of the socialist regimes, the chapter shows that, at the time, socialist elites interpreted them as the perfect conditions to expand economic and political contacts with the West. By these means, the international situation accelerated and cemented Poland's national strategy and allowed its flaws to remain overlooked, if not neglected.

The fourth chapter, the final chapter in the first part, examines the second half of the 1970s, when Poland's situation drastically deteriorated on all fronts. It hones in on the domestic political and economic situation and Poland's relationship with the Soviet Union, as well as with other socialist regimes and the West. It argues that Poland's national strategy in all these fields aimed essentially to preserve the status quo and save the gains made in the early 1970s. Furthermore, it shows that the scale of the turmoil in Poland in the 1980s had its origins in this very status quo strategy.

The second part of the book begins with the fifth chapter, on the goals of licence policy as defined in the early 1970s. It serves as an introduction to the case studies, while explaining the logic underlying the choice of policymakers to explore the practices of opening towards the West. It argues that the licence policy illuminates all the principal objectives of the 1970s national strategy, namely the improvement of the quality of life, technological modernisation, expanding foreign trade, and strengthening détente in Europe.

The following sixth, seventh and eighth chapters are case studies on the production of manufactured goods based on technology from Western Europe: cars, buses, and audio equipment. The choice of these three was not accidental. First, they each represent relationships with different Western European states and other actors representing them. While the production of cars was based on cooperation with Fiat and Italy, the bus industry relied on a relationship with Berliet and France. The case of audio equipment is the most international of the three and involves various companies and countries, though Grundig and the FRG remained the principal source of technology for this industry. Second, the transactions were among the most expensive and ambitious throughout the decade. As such, they not only represented trends in Poland's economy but even went so far as to shape them. Third, Fiat cars, Berliet buses, and audio equipment produced on Grundig licences can be viewed as symbols of the 1970s in Poland. They thus illuminate consumption policy under Gierek and its symbolic dimension.

What follows the three case studies is a summary that takes stock of the gains and losses of the licence policy. This final chapter compares its practices and outcomes with the objectives characterised in the fifth chapter. It suggests that the licence policy cannot be considered a total failure, as many of its goals were indeed reached. At the same time, it shows the degree to which it became a vehicle for Polish-Western entanglement.

The conclusion, which also plays the role of an epilogue, shows how the national strategy of the 1970s provided Western actors with leverage over the situation in Poland and profoundly changed the Polish socialist regimes. The ties with the West consciously constructed by the Polish socialist elites played a capital role for Poland's political and economic future as well as the global transformations of the 1980s and 1990s.

Notes

1 See: Appendix.
2 On the nationalism of the Polish socialist elites see for instance: Mikołaj Kunicki, *Between the Brown and the Red. Nationalism, Catholicism, and Communism in Twentiethth-Century Poland: The Politics of Bolesław Piasecki* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2012); Marcin Zaremba, *Komunizm, legitymizacja, nacjonalizm. Nacjonalistyczna legitymizacja władzy komunistycznej w Polsce* (Warsaw: Trio, 2005).
3 Exploring the differences between European socialist regimes in the 1970s was one of the objectives of the 2015–2020 European Research Council (ERC) project 'PanEur1970s. Looking West: the European Socialist regimes facing pan-European cooperation and the European Community', which the research that led to this book contributed to. For the overall results see: Angela Romano and Federico Romero (eds), *European Socialist Regimes' Fateful Engagement with the West: National Strategies in the Long 1970s* (London and New York: Routledge, 2020).
4 On the inter-bloc dynamic see for instance: Laurien Crump and Angela Romano, 'Challenging the superpower straitjacket (1965–1975): Multilateralism as an instrument of smaller powers', in Laurien Crump and Susanna Erlandsson (eds), *Margins for Manoeuvre in Cold War Europe: The Influence of Smaller Powers* (London: Routledge, 2019), 13–31; Laurien Crump, *The Warsaw Pact Reconsidered: International Relations*

in Eastern Europe, 1955–1969 (New York and London: Routledge, 2015); Suvi Kansikas, 'Room to manoeuvre? National interests and coalition-building in the CMEA, 1969–1974', in Sari Autio-Sarasmo, Katalin Miklóssy (eds), *Reassessing Cold War Europe* (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2011), 193–209; Randall Stone, *Satellites and Commissars: Strategy and Conflict in the Politics of Soviet-Bloc Trade* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

5 On the Soviet Union and its European allies in the 1970s see for instance: Michael De Groot, 'The Soviet Union, CMEA, and the Energy Crisis of the 1970s', *Journal of Cold War Studies* 22:4 (2020): 4–30; Suvi Kansikas, 'Calculating the Burden of Empire: Soviet Oil, East-West Trade, and the End of the Socialist Bloc', in Jeronim Perović (ed.), *Cold War Energy: A Transnational History of Soviet Oil and Gas* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 345–69; Vladislav Zubok, 'The Soviet Union and détente of the 1970s', *Cold War History* 8:4 (2008): 427–47.

6 On Poland's relationship with the Soviet Union in the 1970s see: Jakub Szumski, 'Leonid Brezhnev and Edward Gierek. The Making and Breaking of an Uneven Friendship', *The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review* 45:3 (2018): 253–86; Włodzimierz Borodziej, 'Polskie peryferie polityki zagranicznej Związku Radzieckiego: lata siedemdziesiąte', in Włodzimierz Borodziej and Sławomir Dębski (eds), *Modernizacja. Centrum. Peryferie. Księga jubileuszowa z okazji 70. rocznicy urodzin Profesora Ryszarda Stemplowskiego* (Warsaw: Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, 2009), 51–72; Andrzej Skrzypek, *Mechanizmy klientelizmu. Stosunki polsko-radzieckie 1965–1989* (Pułtusk: Akademia Humanistyczna im. Aleksandra Gieysztora, 2008).

7 Błażej Brzostek and Marcin Zaremba, 'Polska 1956–1976: w poszukiwaniu paradygmatu', *Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość* 5:2 (2006): 25–28; Dariusz Jarosz, 'Post-1989 historiography's distorted image of the relations between authorities and society in Poland during the period from 1944 to 1989', *Revue d'études comparatives Est-Ouest* 2:45 (2014): 215–40; Małgorzata Fidelis, 'Pleasures and Perils of Socialist Modernity: New Scholarship on Postwar Eastern Europe', *Contemporary European History* 26:3 (2017): 533–44.

8 Stephen Kotkin with a contribution by Jan Gross, *Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment* (New York: Modern Library, 2009).

9 Kazimierz Poznański, 'Outgoing Party-State: Incompetent or Self-Interested? Comments on Kotkin's Uncivil Society', *East Central Europe* 40:1–2 (2013): 161–66.

10 Jakub Szumski, *Rozliczenie z ekipą Gierka 1980–1984* (Warsaw: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2018).

11 See for instance: Waldemar Kuczyński, *Po wielkim skoku* (1979, repr. Warsaw: Poltex, 2012); Joanna Kotowicz-Jawor, *Presja inwestycyjna w latach siedemdziesiątych* (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1983); For an overview of this debate: Batara Simatupang, *The Polish Economic Crisis: Background, Causes and Aftermath* (London: Routledge, 1994), 149–67.

12 Timothy Garton Ash, *The Polish Revolution: Solidarity* (1983, reprinted London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1985), 14.

13 Edward Gierek and Janusz Rolicki, *Przerwana dekada* (Warsaw: Fakt, 1990); Other examples: Piotr Jaroszewicz and Bohdan Roliński, *Przerywam milczenie…* (Warsaw: Fakt, 1991); Paweł Bożyk, *Apokalipsa według Pawła: jak zniszczono nasz kraj* (Wrocław: Wektory, 2015). The 2022 Polish movie production 'Gierek' directed by Michał Węgrzyn also defended the 1970s leadership in this vein.

14 *Economic Survey of Europe in 1991–1992* (New York: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 1992), 322.

15 Paweł Sasanka, 'Polska Gierka- Dekada przerwana czy zmarnowana?', in Paweł Machcewicz and Krzysztof Persak (eds), *PRL od grudnia 70 do czerwca 89* (Warsaw: Bellona and Muzeum Historii Polski, 2011), 9–34; Jerzy Eisler, 'Zmarnowana dekada', *Rzeczpospolita*, 4–5 August 2001.

16 For instance: Wanda Jarząbek, 'Polish economic policy at the time of détente, 1966–78', *European Review of History* 21:2 (2014): 298; Jerzy Eisler, *Czterdzieści pięć lat, które wstrząsnęły Polską. Historia polityczna PRL* (Warsaw: Czerwone i Czarne, 2018), 288–351.

17 For studies embracing such an approach to socialist elites see for instance: Robert English, *Russia and the Idea of the West. Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).

18 For a review of this new scholarship of the 1970s see: Michele Di Donato, 'Landslides, Shocks, and New Global Rules: The US and Western Europe in the New International History of the 1970s', *Journal of Contemporary History* 55:1 (2020): 182–205.

19 For a review of Cold War historiography see: Federico Romero, 'Cold war historiography at the crossroads', *Cold War History* 14:4 (2014): 685–703.

20 The literature on the Ostpolitik in Western Europe is immense. See for instance: Gottfried Niedhart, 'Ostpolitik: Transformation through Communication and the Quest for Peaceful Change', *Journal of Cold War Studies* 18:3 (2016): 14–59; Arne Hofmann, *The emergence of détente in Europe: Brandt, Kennedy and the formation of Ostpolitik* (London: Routledge, 2007); Pierre Bouillon, *Le prix de la détente?: La politique française en Hongrie et en Roumanie* (1968–1977) (Rennes: PUR, 2016); Sara Tavani, "*Non dovrà essere un'altra Yalta". L'Ostpolitik italiana degli anni Sessanta e la ricerca di un nuovo ordine europeo* (Milano: CEDAM, 2017).

21 Csaba Békés, 'Détente and the Soviet Bloc. From Promoter to Victim, 1975–91', in Poul Villaume, Rasmus Mariager and Helle Porsdam (eds), *The 'Long 1970s': Human Rights, East-West Détente and Transnational Relations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2016), 165–83.

22 For the variety of approaches to the European détente see for instance: Villaume, Mariager and Porsdam (eds), *The 'Long 1970s'*; Autio-Sarasmo and Miklóssy (eds), *Reassessing Cold War Europe*.

23 Jarząbek, 'Polish economic policy'; Wanda Jarząbek, 'Hope and Reality: Poland and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1964–1989', *Cold War International History Project*, Working Paper 56, Woodrow Wilson Centre for Scholars (2008); Wanda Jarząbek, 'The Impact of the German Question on Polish Attitudes toward CSCE, 1964–1975', *Journal of Cold War Studies* 18:3 (2016): 139–57 and other studies by Jarząbek; Katarzyna Stokłosa, *Polen und die deutsche Ostpolitik 1945–1990* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011); Zdzisław Lachowski, 'Diplomatic File- Polish Diplomacy and the CSCE Process during the Cold War Period', *The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs* 4 (2007): 73–104.

24 On Poland's diplomacy in the 1970s in general: Andrzej Skrzypek, *Dyplomatyczne dzieje PRL w latach 1956–1989* (Pułtusk: Akademia Humanistyczna im. Aleksandra Gieysztora, 2010), 188–302; Andrzej Skrzypek, 'Dyplomacja sukcesu? Międzynarodowa aktywność ekipy Edwarda Gierka w latach 1971–1975', *Zeszyty Naukowe Ostrołęckiego Towarzystwa Naukowego* 21 (2007): 163–205. On bilateral relations with Western European states see for instance: Dariusz Jarosz and Maria Pasztor, *Polska-Francja, 1970–1980. Relacje wyjątkowe?* (Warsaw: Aspra, 2012); Dariusz Jarosz and Maria Pasztor, *Nie tylko Fiat. Z dziejów stosunków polsko-włoskich 1945–1989* (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 2018); Jacek Tebinka, 'Polityka Wielkiej Brytanii wobec Polski Edwarda Gierka, grudzień 1970- luty 1974', in Krzysztof Ruchniewicz, Bożena Szaynok and Jakub Tyszkiewicz (eds), *W Dekadzie Gierka* (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2010), 102–17. On Polish foreign policy in specific years see: introductions to *Polskie Dokumenty Dyplomatyczne* (Polish diplomatic documents) volumes on the 1970s.

25 Jacques Andréani, *Le Piège: Helsinki et la chute du communisme* (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2005).

26 On détente as a conservative policy see for instance: essays on Western Europe in Frédéric Bozo, Marie-Pierre Rey, Piers Ludlow and Bernd Rother (eds), *Vision of the*

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27 See for instance: Jan van der Harst (ed.), *Beyond the Customs Union: The European Community's Quest for Deepening, Widening, and Completion, 1969–1975* (Brussels: Bruylant, 2007); Johnny Laursen (eds), *The Institutions and Dynamics of the European Community, 1973–83* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2014); Claudia Hiepel (ed.), *Europe in a globalizing world: global challenges and European responses in the "long" 1970s* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2014).

28 Piers Ludlow, 'The History of the EC and the Cold War: Influenced and Influential, but Rarely Centre Stage', in Ulrich Krotz, Kiran Klaus Patel and Federico Romero (eds), *Europe's Cold War Relations: The EC Towards a Global Role* (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020), 24. This point resonates in the majority of essays in this volume.

29 On the crisis in the transatlantic alliance see for instance: Aurélie Élisa Gfeller, *Building a European Identity. France, the United States and the Oil Shock, 1973–1974* (New York: Berghahn, 2012); Matthias Schulz and Thomas Alan Schwartz (eds), *The strained alliance: U.S.-European relations from Nixon to Carter* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Daniel Möckli, *European Foreign Policy During the Cold War: Heath, Brandt, Pompidou and the Dream of Political Unity* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2008).

30 Angela Romano, 'Untying Cold War knots: The EEC and Eastern Europe in the long 1970s', *Cold War History* 14:2 (2014): 153–73; Angela Romano, *From Détente in Europe to European Détente: How the West Shaped the Helsinki CSCE* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2009); Benedetto Zaccaria, *The EEC's Yugoslav Policy in Cold War Europe, 1968–1980* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

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32 See for instance: Suvi Kansikas, *Socialist Countries Face the European Community. Soviet-Bloc Controversies over East-West Trade* (Frankfurt am Mein: Peter Lang, 2014); Jack Kaikati, 'Models of Success and Failure in European Integration', *East European Quarterly* 26:3 (1992): 291–307; Domenico Mario Nuti, 'Economic Relations between the European Community and CMEA', EUI Working Paper, 88/360 (1988).

33 See for instance: chapters on national cases in Romano and Romero (eds), *European Socialist Regimes*; Francesco Di Palma and Wolfgang Mueller (eds), *Kommunismus und Europa. Europapolitik und vorstellungen europäischer kommunistischer Parteien im Kalten Krieg* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2016). On Poland: Dagmara Jajeśniak-Quast, 'Reaktionen auf die Westeuropäische Wirtschaftsintegration in Ostmitteleuropa: Die Tschechoslowakei und Polen in den fünfziger bis zu den siebziger Jahren', *Journal of European Integration History* 13:2 (2007): 69–84; Aleksandra Komornicka, 'Winner of the Saki Ruth Dockrill Memorial Prize "The Unity of Europe is inevitable": Poland and the European Economic Community in the 1970s', *Cold War History* 20:4 (2020): 483–501.

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39 James Mark, Artemy Kalinovsky and Steffi Marung (eds), *Alternative Globalizations: Eastern Europe and the Postcolonial World* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2020). For a general overview of this historiography: Mark and Rupprecht, 'The Socialist World in Global History'; David Engerman, 'The Second World's Third World', *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 12:1 (2011): 183–221.

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